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For the past three decades, China has evolved from a position of marginal relevance 
for outward foreign direct investment to becoming an important source country 
among developing countries. To much extent, this is the result of steady economic 
reforms initiated with of the ‘Open-Door’ policies in 1978 with the aim of changing 
the domestic industrial and economic structure and increasing the integration of 
China’s economy and its businesses into the global economy. This paper is an attempt 
to assess the development of China’s outward direct investment since 1978 with 
regard to the institutional framework and to traces the effects of policy and regulatory 
changes on scope and quantity of outward direct investment. 
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Since the instigation of the ‘Open-Door’ policies in 1978, China has experienced three 
decades of economic reform. These reforms have been aimed at changing the 
domestic industrial structure and increasing the degree of integration of China’s 
economy and its businesses into the global economy. As a result, China has evolved 
from a position of marginal relevance in terms of its outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI)1 to becoming an important source country among developing 
countries. 
 
China appears as an interesting lens through which to examine the relationship 
between home country institutions and outbound international business because the 
Chinese economy was a closed, planned system until 1978, grew into a ‘two 
economic systems, one country’ arrangement during the 1980s until the mid-1990s 
and out of the plan (Naughton, 1995) and then to a much more market-based economy 
by ‘finding the stones to cross the river’. This is also true for the development of 
China’s ODI. 
 
1.2 Objective of the Study 
 
This paper assesses the development of China’s ODI over thirty years considering 
changes that happened in Chinese institutional framework. The investigation aims to 
demonstrate how institutional changes have affected China to outbound FDI and so 
contribute to understanding on the effect that political institutions can have on 
                                                     
1 We understand FDI as a long-term cross-border investment that allows an investor to have a significant voice in the 
management of an enterprise operating outside the investor’s own country. The phrase “significant voice” usually 
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international business. In addition, by synthesising extant understanding of the key 
government actors working ‘behind the scenes’ and their roles and activities, and by 
charting the decentralisation and localisation of regulatory measures, the paper 
provides an analysis of institutional change in a key aspect to China’s political 
economy. Finally, the paper provides a framework to understand the factors that have 
shapes the character, scope and strategic intent of Chinese OFDI activities in the past, 
and into the future. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 
There is a plethora of analyses of developing countries’ outward FDI. One of arguably 
the first conducted by Lecraw (1977), in response to the rise of outward FDI from 
developing countries, focuses on the characteristics of developing countries’ overseas 
firms. Lecraw concluded that these firms tend to use labour-intensive technology and 
produce for both domestic and international markets. Other studies focused primarily 
on explaining what advantage(s) drive developing countries’ multinational firms. 
Wells (1983) argued that multinational corporations from developing counties possess 
the same basic advantages as those from developed countries, but they are derived 
from different sources. Lall (1983) and Tolentino (1993) further added that such 
adapted advantages may help multinational firms from developing countries 
overcome various disadvantages in host countries and predicted that FDI from 
developing countries should choose countries with economic and cultural similarities 
and geographic proximity as destinations. In addition, outward FDI from developing 
countries has been undertaken as an effective vehicle for developing countries to 
access localized innovative assets and capabilities. Such asset-seeking FDI tries to 
enhance the enterprise’s dynamic competitive advantage by strategically locating 
itself around geographically dispersed local innovation centres in order to augment the 
competitive advantage of its parent company or parent country. This asset-seeking and 
innovation-enhancing interest in the FDI phenomenon may help explain the sharply 
increased amount of FDI inflows into the United States and other developed countries 
from many developing countries (Wesson, 1993). Against this backdrop, little 
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regulations that superintend the development of their outbound investment. Cattaneo2 
is one of the scholars who conducted an institutional approach of political economy to 
highlight the relationship between economic development and social institutions. 
Without rejecting the role of other economic variables, Cattaneo paid important 
attention on the intertwinement between economic processes and those related to 
institutions and how these evolve over time.  
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology chosen for this study belongs to the institutional and 
political economy approach. We assume the existing relationship between economic 
development and social institutions, believing that a kind of interdependence could be 
identified between them. As could say Cattaneo, the economic development influences 
the formation of institutions and, in turn, the institutions affect the possible paths that 
economic development may take (Mistri, 2008). Institutions are important, because 
they determine ‘the rules of the game’, and shape the environment in which 
international business takes place, and the information collection costs, and 
transaction costs, that firms incur abroad.  
This study employs extensive desk research and survey on reports of past and more 
recent development of Chinese economy. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
 
This paper is organised as follows. The next chapter describes the major government 
actors affecting China’s OFDI. In the third chapter, we try to provide a general profile 
of China’s ODI before we describe, in the fourth chapter, the evolution and changes in 
OFDI regulation over the past thirty years and the range of responsibilities of the 
major government actors. The fifth chapter is devoted to some concluding remarks. 
                                                     






















There are a number of key political and administrative actors in China that impinge 
upon OFDI from China by setting the laws and regulations confronting outward 
investing firms and by being actors in the investment approval process.   
 
2.1 Main Administrative Actors 
 
The main actors are the State Council, the State Administration for Foreign Exchange, 
the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China, the National Development 
and Reform Commission, and the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission.  
 
The State Council  
The State Council drafts and develops law and regulations as well as coordinates the 
national economic development. It also manages foreign affairs and concludes 
bilateral treaties. The State Council decides upon major economic policies and 
liberalisation measures, although the policy initiatives for these steps may come from 
subordinate organs such as the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) or 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).  
 
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)  
The SAFE was established in 1979 under the Bank of China and is responsible for 
administering usage and flow of foreign exchange. SAFE consolidated the activities 
and responsibilities that were formerly distributed across several ministries in relation 
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Although the authority over SAFE moved in 1982 from the Bank of China to the 
newly created central bank, the People’s Bank of China, SAFE remained relatively 
independent until a subsequent government restructuring in 1998 (Lin and Schramm, 
2003; Shi and Gelb, 1998).  The restructuring led to SAFE strengthening its 
OFDI-related mandate in the following ways:  
(i) the reporting of the balance of payments (BOP) data to the State Council and the 
International Monetary Fund,  
(ii)  recommending foreign exchange policies to the People’s Bank of China,  
(iii) overseeing the transfer of foreign exchange out of and into China under the 
capital account of the BOP, and  
(iv)  managing China’s foreign exchange reserves (Zhang, 2004).   
 
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)  
The Ministry of Commerce was established in its current form and function in 2003.  
The major responsibilities of MOFCOM with regard to Chinese OFDI relate to:  
(i) the supervision of Chinese OFDI by drafting and implementing policies and 
regulations and considering non-financial OFDI projects for approval;  
(ii)  bilateral and multilateral negotiations on investment and trade treaties and 
representing China at the World Trade Organisation and other international 
economic organisations;  
(iii) ensuring the alignment of China’s economic and trade laws with international 
treaties and agreements; and  
(iv)  coordinating China’s foreign aid policy and relevant funding and loan 
schemes (Munro and Yan, 2003).   
These functions provide MOFCOM with direct and indirect opportunities to guide and 
influence the scope and direction of Chinese OFDI. Indeed, MOFCOM issued the first 
regulation on Chinese ODI in 1984 (Zhang, 2003). 
 
 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC)  
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currently directly supervised by the State Council.  The PBC is responsible for the 
overall financial policies and rules and dealings with international financial 
organisations such as the World Bank. It also supervises and manages the foreign 
exchange reserves of China.   With respect to the latter function, the PBC imposed 
significant changes to China’s foreign exchange regime in 1994 and this provided it 
with tighter foreign exchange control.  The combined powers over domestic 
monetary and financial policies and foreign exchange control give the PBC the ability 
to arbitrage one function against another. Careful management of China’s foreign 
exchange reserves used in international investment projects by Chinese companies has 
helped the PBC to fulfil a number of domestic monetary objectives, including a stable 
and low inflation rate because domestic enterprises could be encouraged to spend 
Yuan to reduce pressure on the monetary supply side (Pettis, 2005).   Prior to 1992, 
the PBC regulated the financial service sector and hence the foreign investments of 
financial institutions.  In 1992, securities, insurance and banking services were spun 
off into separate regulatory authorities including the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission that today approves OFDI projects by Chinese banks (Pearson, 2005). 
 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
The National Development and Reform Commission sometimes referred to by its old 
name, the State Development and Reform Commission, emerged from the 
institutional structure of the State Planning Commission. The NDRC is the main 
government body that designs, regulates and coordinates the economic development 
and industrial policy of China.   As part of this function, it regulates government 
investments in domestic industries.    One key function of the NRDC is to develop 
“strategies, goals and policies to balance and optimise China’s overseas investments.” 
(Munro and Yan,  2003).    As part of this role, the NDRC has issued guidelines 
concerning access of domestic firms to soft loans to finance their internationalisation.  
In a similar vein, the NDRC, in cooperation with MOFCOM, has published a host 
country catalogue that lists the countries for which the Chinese government subsidies 
FDI projects (Zweig and Bi, 2005).  The NDRC is also involved in the approval 
process of Chinese OFDI.   Large-scale Chinese OFDI projects in industry sectors 
such as natural resources and other projects involving larger sums of foreign exchange 
need prior investment approval from the NDRC.   The threshold has changed over 
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from NDRC’s responsibility to maintain equilibrium in balance of payments (Munro 
and Yan, 2003). 
 
The State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
A relatively new governmental authority is the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC).  SASAC was established by the State 
Council in 2003 to represent the Chinese government in non-financial state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  As the Chinese government is the ultimate owner and investor 
in SOEs, SASAC has wide-reaching responsibilities and powers (Naughton, 2007; 
Pearson, 2005).  Prior to SASAC’s establishment, its functions were divided between 
the State Economic Trade Commission and several ministries and other government 
authorities that controlled and supervised ‘their’ companies independently from each 
other. This sometimes created competing SOEs.  In this respect, it is the objective of 
the SASAC as an investor to ensure that the SOEs under its supervision remain 
competitive and increase their profitability and the value of the assets under their 
control.  However, it remains questionable if such an institution can fulfil this type of 
objective, since its supervision is split:  the national SASAC directly controls nearly 
170 national SOEs while sub-national SASACs act at a provincial level (Naughton, 
2006, 2007).  Both types of SASAC exercise their power through the appointment of 
senior managers to SOEs and through involvement in major decision-making of firms 
under its control (Naughton, 2007).  A considerable number of senior management 
positions are actually appointed directly by the Chinese Communist Party (Naughton, 
2007).  This structure and the strong influence of the party do not necessarily lead to 
the appointment of the most suitable, but rather the most rewarded, managerial 
candidates, and this has a number of implications for the company’s domestic and 
international operations.  OFDI projects by SOEs under the supervision of SASAC 
are unlikely to be decided without the explicit approval of SASAC.  The decision to 
invest overseas, either through a greenfield investment or an acquisition, can be 
regarded as a major decision that impacts on the company’s profitability and the value 
of the involved assets.  Any OFDI project by an SOE therefore touches upon the key 
objectives of SASAC.  Examples of overseas invested Chinese firms under the direct 
control of SASAC include the following (each of which rank among the Top 100 
developing country MNEs as published by UNCTAD [2007]), namely, China National 
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